


# BACKGROUND GUIDE



# IAEA

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

---

## AGENDA

*Discussing measures to strengthen the compliance mechanisms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1970) to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy.*



EDITION XII

# CHIREC MUN '24

Represent • Reason • Resolve

# LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

Salutations Delegates,

It is our pleasure to welcome you to ChirecMUN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We will follow the broadly used UNA-USA Rules of Procedure throughout the conference and will place significant importance on diplomacy, courtesy, adherence to foreign policy and sovereign exercise of functions.

It is of utmost importance that the mandate of the IAEA and its bottomline goal of global nuclear safety is kept in mind.

We, the Executive Board, are more than excited to moderate your perceptive discussions and debates.

Our meetings are inclusive, and strongly averse to discrimination, misconduct and malpractices. As a representative at the conference, Members shall be bound by the codes of conduct, policies and regulations of the conference. Needless to say, we expect the highest possible standard of commitment from all members involved. With hope that you will enhance the quality of this meeting with your substantive participation. We will strive to maintain a positive, inclusive and educational atmosphere for all.

Remember, this background guide is not the end of your research but just its beginning. We expect all delegates to come prepared to committee with a much more detailed, holistic, contextualized and country-specific outlook on the agenda. Moreover, we eagerly anticipate reading your research in your position papers.

Furthermore, we would like to clarify that the point of our committee is not to discuss the advantages or disadvantages of nuclear weapons, nor nuclear technology. Rather, we want our debate to focus on the advantages, disadvantages, limitations and powers of the NPT itself, and hope that you all research accordingly.

In the event that you wish to contact us before the MUN, please send an email to [iaeachirecmun2024@gmail.com](mailto:iaeachirecmun2024@gmail.com) with your questions

Looking forward to working with you,

Tarun Neeraj: Chairperson - 7013213477

Manann Sarda: Vice Chairperson - 8121811176

Vetali Machavarapu: Rapporteur - 8985608000

# INTRODUCTION

## Overview of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The Treaty represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States. A total of 191 States have joined the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon States. More countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to the Treaty's significance. The Treaty is regarded as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament.

To further the goal of non-proliferation and as a confidence-building measure between States parties, the Treaty establishes a safeguards system under the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Safeguards are used to verify compliance with the Treaty through inspections conducted by the IAEA. The Treaty promotes cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear technology and equal access to this technology for all States parties, while safeguards prevent the diversion of fissile material for weapons use.

# HISTORICAL CONTEXT

## ORIGINS OF THE NPTS

From the beginning of the nuclear age, and the use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, it has been apparent that the development of nuclear capabilities by States could enable them to divert technology and materials for weapons purposes. Thus the problem of preventing such diversions became a central issue in discussions on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Initial efforts, which began in 1946, to create an international system enabling all States to have access to nuclear technology under appropriate safeguards, were terminated in 1949 without the achievement of this objective, due to serious political differences between the major Powers. By then, both the United States and the former Soviet Union had tested nuclear weapons, and were beginning to build their stockpiles.

In December 1953, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower in his “Atoms for Peace” proposal, presented to the eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly, and urged that an international organization be established to disseminate peaceful nuclear technology, while guarding against development of weapons capabilities in additional countries. His proposal resulted in the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957, which was charged with the dual responsibility of promotion and control of nuclear technology.

IAEA technical assistance activities began in 1958. An interim safeguards system for small nuclear reactors, put in place in 1961, was replaced in 1964 by a system covering larger installations and, over the following years, was expanded to include additional nuclear facilities.

By 1968 final agreement had been reached on a Treaty that would prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, enable co-operation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament.

The Treaty provided, in article X, for a conference to be convened 25 years after its entry into force to decide whether the Treaty should continue in force indefinitely, or be extended for an additional fixed period or periods.

Accordingly, at the NPT Review and Extension Conference in May 1995, States parties to the Treaty agreed—without a vote—on the Treaty's indefinite extension, and decided that review conferences should continue to be held every five years.

In recent years, efforts to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system culminated in the approval of the Model Additional Protocol by the IAEA Board of Governors in May 1997

# STRUCTURE AND PROVISIONS OF THE NPT

## PREAMBLE

The preamble of the treaty highlights the importance of ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear arms, and it commits to cooperating with the IAEA to safeguard peaceful nuclear activities, supports research to monitor nuclear materials, and promotes the peaceful use of nuclear technology for all nations. It outlines the aim of the treaty to halt the nuclear arms race, achieve nuclear disarmament, and end nuclear weapon tests. It stresses reducing international tensions, eliminating nuclear stockpiles, and adhering to the UN Charter's principles of maintaining global peace and security with minimal diversion of resources to armaments.

## ARTICLES I–III: NON–PROLIFERATION OBLIGATIONS

Article I states the intention of every state which ratifies the treaty to prevent the transfer of nuclear weapons, transfer of control of nuclear weapons or assist a non-nuclear State Party to the Treaty in their attempts to acquire nuclear weapons.

Article II is similar to Article I, but it states the intention not to receive the transfer of any nuclear weapons, control of them or assistance regarding the same

Article III mandates the implementation of safeguards in all manner of peaceful use of nuclear energy.



#### **Article IV: Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy**

This article grants all nations party to it the inalienable right to research into, develop, produce and use nuclear energy for all peaceful uses. It also promotes the transfer of of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, provided that the nations Party to the treaty follow the rules outlined.

#### **Article V: Peaceful Nuclear Explosions**

Article 5 grants all states party to the treaty the right to use nuclear explosions for peaceful uses. It also grants all non-nuclear weapon states party to the treaty the right to use these peaceful nuclear explosions.

#### **Article VI: Disarmament**

All parties agree to pursue negotiations in good faith on eective measures relating to ending the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament, and a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

#### **Article VII–XI: Miscellaneous Provisions**

**Article VII** arms the right of any group of states to conclude regional treaties to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

**Article VIII** allows all states part to the treaty the right to suggest amendments, and that these amendments will be added if they are voted into majority.

**Article IX** states that the treaty is open for signature by any state and requires ratification according to each state's constitutional processes. It ocially entered into force when 40 states, including nuclear-weapon states, ratified it.

**Article X** grants all parties the ability to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary events have jeopardized its supreme interests. The party must give three months' notice and explain the reasons. Every ve years, parties meet to review the implementation of the treaty.

**Article XI** covers the procedural details such as depositary governments (the USA, UK, and USSR), languages of the treaty, and where the original documents are kept.



# CHALLENGES TO THE NPT

## **Non-Compliance and Enforcement Issues**

Non-compliance with the NPT remains a significant challenge. Certain countries have pursued nuclear weapons capabilities clandestinely, raising concerns about the effectiveness of the Treaty's enforcement mechanisms. The IAEA's ability to detect and respond to violations is critical, but it often faces political and technical hurdles. Strengthening the verification regime and ensuring that the IAEA has the necessary resources and authority to perform its duties effectively are ongoing challenges.

## **Cases of Nuclear Proliferation**

Several cases of nuclear proliferation have tested the robustness of the NPT. Notable examples include North Korea's withdrawal from the Treaty and subsequent development of nuclear weapons, as well as concerns over Iran's nuclear program. These cases highlight the complexities involved in ensuring compliance and the geopolitical factors that can influence states' decisions to pursue nuclear capabilities.

## **Emerging Nuclear Threats**

Emerging nuclear threats, such as the potential for non-state actors to acquire nuclear materials and technology, pose new challenges to the NPT framework. The rise of cyber threats and the increasing sophistication of terrorist organizations necessitate a reevaluation of existing non-proliferation strategies and the development of new measures to address these evolving risks.

# RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

## **Recent Conferences and Review Meetings**

Recent NPT Review Conferences have seen mixed outcomes, with some progress on specific issues but also significant disagreements among states parties. The 2015 Review Conference, for example, failed to produce a consensus final document, reflecting deep divisions over disarmament and regional security issues. These conferences are crucial for assessing the Treaty's implementation and addressing emerging challenges.

## **Future Challenges and Opportunities**

The future of the NPT will depend on the international community's ability to address several key challenges: ensuring compliance, adapting to new technological developments, and managing geopolitical tensions. Opportunities for strengthening the Treaty include enhancing verification measures, promoting disarmament efforts, and fostering greater international cooperation on peaceful nuclear energy use.

## **Potential Reforms to the NPT Framework**

Reforms to the NPT framework could involve measures to enhance the IAEA's verification capabilities, mechanisms to address non-compliance more effectively, and initiatives to promote nuclear disarmament more vigorously. Additionally, expanding the scope of the Treaty to address emerging threats and incorporating new technologies could help maintain its relevance and effectiveness in the future.

# CONCLUSION

## **Summary of Key Points**

The NPT remains a cornerstone of global nuclear non-proliferation efforts, with a broad base of international support and a comprehensive framework for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. However, challenges such as non-compliance, emerging threats, and geopolitical tensions require ongoing attention and adaptation.

## **Importance of Continued Efforts for Non-Proliferation**

Continued efforts to strengthen the NPT, enhance international cooperation, and address new challenges are essential for maintaining global nuclear security. The commitment of states parties to the principles of the Treaty and their active engagement in its processes will be crucial for its success.



# REFERENCES AND FURTHER READING

## **Suggested Books, Articles, and Reports**

- "The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: The Origins of the NPT and Its Critical Role in Arms Control" by Ramesh Thakur
- "Nuclear Weapons and International Security: Collected Essays" by Ramesh Thakur
- "Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Security: The NPT Regime" by Kelsey Davenport

## **Relevant Websites and Online Resources**

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) – [www.iaea.org](http://www.iaea.org)

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) – [www.un.org/disarmament](http://www.un.org/disarmament)

Arms Control Association – [www.armscontrol.org](http://www.armscontrol.org)